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Abstract
Extensive multilingualism is one of the most important and fundamental principles of the Eu-
ropean Union (EU). However, a large number of languages (currently 23) hinders communication
and imposes substantial nancial and legal costs. On the other hand, the reduction of the number
of languages would disenfranchise some or many EU citizens. We use the results of a survey on
languages and argue that even though a linguistic reform reducing the number of languages is
unlikely to gain su¢ cient political support today, this may change in the future since young people
are more procient at speaking foreign languages.
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1 Introduction
Linguistic diversity and its impact on public policies increasingly appear at the forefront of public
debate in various countries and international organizations. Linguistic issues are almost unparalleled
in terms of their patriotic and emotional appeal and, as was pointed out by Bretton (1976, p. 447),
language may be the most explosive issue universally and over time. This is mainly because language
alone, unlike all other concerns associated with nationalism and ethnocentrism . . . is so closely tied
to the individual self. Fear of being deprived of communicating skills seems to raise political passion
to a fever pitch.
The emergence of multilingual societies is well-documented over the course of the human history,
but is by no means a thing of the past. The latest version of the Ethnologue database lists 6,912
distinct languages spoken all over the world. Since there are only 271 nations, dependencies and
other entities, a large number of countries, if not most, must therefore be multilingual. Even though
many of these nearly seven thousand languages are spoken in small and often remote and isolated
communities, linguistic heterogeneity is wide-spread in todays world.
A functional multilingual society requires willingness on behalf of the participating linguistic
groups to make compromises and to accept some linguistic standardization. This can, in turn,
deliver important benets in terms of improved communication, increased trade, better economic
performance and enhanced administrative e¢ ciency. Language standardization, however, restricts
the linguistic rights of some groups; in line with Ginsburgh and Weber (2005) and Ginsburgh,
Ortuño-Ortin and Weber (2005), we refer to this phenomenon as linguistic disenfranchisement. Note
that the e¤ect of curtailing the use of some languages goes beyond limiting access to information.
Linguistic-minority members may feel that their language loses ground and they may in turn refrain
from participating actively in the political process, or may even become unable to do so e¤ectively.
In the European context, EU laws take precedence over national legislation. Therefore the citizens
ability to receive information and to communicate in their own language has profound and direct
implications on the economic and social fabric of the society and individual well-being.
Although English, French and, to a lesser extent, German are the languages used internally
by the administration, all o¢ cial communication between EU institutions and citizens of member
countries or their government institutions as well as the sessions of the European Parliament are
carried out in all 23 o¢ cial languages. The same principle applies to all published legal documents of
general application (such as regulations, directives or decisions addressed to member states) and to
publications in the O¢ cial Journal. There are, however, provisions that allow the possibility that the
Council of the European Union can, under special circumstances, legislate a restricted set of languages
and that countries can voluntarily limit translation into their o¢ cial language. The European Court
also held that Art. 314 of the Treaty (on multilingualism and o¢ cial languages) does not enshrine
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an absolute Community law principle of the equality of all languages. [...] It follows that, because no
absolute value attaches to the provisions of Art. 314, there will be circumstances where documents
intended to produce legally binding e¤ects can legitimately be drafted in some of the Community
o¢ cial languages only, which would then carry equal weight and authenticity as tools to interpret
legislative intention.(Athanassiou, 2006, p. 11).
Our objective in this paper is to discuss the options for linguistic standardization as well as its
likely political impact. At present, changes in the linguistic regime are subject to the unanimity
rule although, given the provisions mentioned in the previous paragraph, such standardization is
possible if approved by the Council. It is therefore important to examine the political support for
such policies.
First, we assess the relative importance of European languages by examining disenfranchisement
as reected in linguistic prociency (or the lack of thereof) of EU citizens. Our analysis is based on
a unique, comprehensive and, to the best of our knowledge, previously unexplored survey dataset on
languages and their use (Special Eurobarometer 255, 2006). We focus on disenfranchisement that
would result if the full set of EUs 23 languages were limited to a more restrictive subset of core
languages. Then we turn to examining subsets of o¢ cial languages which could be supported by the
Council of the EU under the application of qualied majority voting (QMV) as stipulated by the Nice
and Lisbon Treaties. We show that the number of core languages would have to be relatively large:
depending on the extent of linguistic disenfranchisement deemed as tolerable, between seven and
eleven core languages would be required in order to meet all the currently applied Nice Treaty QMV
criteria; application of the Lisbon Treaty would facilitate between ve and eleven core languages.
We also analyze the implications of Penroses square root law under which every country is assigned
a voting weight proportional to the square root of its population (see Penrose, 1946 and Laurelle and
Widgren, 1998). The Penrose weight allocation represents the probability, that given a hypothetical
vote in the European Council, the decision of a given country is decisive. The allocation has,
therefore, been proposed in order to reect an equal inuence of every EU citizen on decisions of the
European Council.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the notion of linguistic disenfran-
chisement. In Section 3 we use the provisions of the Nice and Lisbon Treaties to identify the sets
of core languages sustainable under the possible application of Qualied Majority and examine the
implications of the Penrose Law. Section 4 concludes.
2 Linguistic disenfranchisement
The challenges posed by the extensive multilingualism embraced by the EU (in particular the high
cost of supporting 23 o¢ cial languages and the practical di¢ culties related to ensuring high-quality
translations and interpretation to and from multiple languages) necessitate a search for alternative
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solutions. Currently over 90 percent of the documents issued by the EU are drafted in English,
French or German. Most of these are subsequently translated into some or all of the other o¢ cial
languages, including languages that have a small number of speakers or languages of populations
that often are able to understand a language other than their own.
The choice of core languages should take into account the number of EU citizens who speak each
language, including those outside of the native country of the language. The concept of linguistic
disenfranchisement does this: it quanties the number of citizens who would nd themselves unable
to communicate if their native language does not belong to the group of core languages and if they
do not speak any of the core languages. Formally, let  = f1; : : : ; Lg be the current set of languages
spoken in the EU. For any subset T of , disenfranchisement in country k, dk (T ), can be dened as:
dk (T ) = nk   vk (T ) ; (1)
where nk is the population of country k and vk (T ) is the number of country ks citizens who speak
at least one of the languages in T . To compare disenfranchisement across countries, it is convenient
to express it in terms of disenfranchisement rates:
Dk (T ) =
nk   vk (T )
nk
: (2)
Table 1 exhibits the rates for the seven most widely spread languages in each EUmember country.1
Note that if English were the only core language it would still leave 62.6 percent of EUs citizens
disenfranchised, and there are only seven countries in which disenfranchisement would be below 50
percent.
Insert Table 1.
Young people often speak foreign languages more readily. We therefore report also EU-wide
disenfranchisement rates for four age groups (15-29, 30-44, 45-59, over 60). The data show that
English is the only language for which disenfranchisement rates are signicantly lower among younger
generations.
Insert Table 2.
Determining the set of o¢ cial languages for a multilingual society entails, implicitly or ex-
plicitly, a cost-and-benets analysis. The society must weigh the benets of multilingualism against
its costs. The latter go beyond the monetary costs of maintaining several parallel languages: com-
munication is more cumbersome when speakers of di¤erent languages interact with each other, the
1The notion of disenfranchisement rate that we use is relatively strict: it comprises not only those who do not speak
the language in question but also those who say that they only have a basic knowledge of it.
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need to translate o¢ cial documents results in delays, and the costs due to misunderstanding or erro-
neous translations are important as well. However, if the costs depend only on the number of chosen
languages, the search for an optimal linguistic regime boils down to achieving the lowest possible
disenfranchisement with a given number of languages. The analysis that follows yields the subsets
of languages that minimize disenfranchisement in this way. Let m  L be a positive integer and for
every m  L, denote by Tm the subset of  that minimizes the disenfranchisement rate over all sets
with m languages:
D (Tm) = minjT j=m
D (T ) ; (3)
where jT j denotes the number of languages in the set T .
The results of these computations are reproduced in Table 3.2 Each column indicates which
language should be added to the subset formed by the languages reported in the preceding columns
so as to minimize disenfranchisement. Consider rst the results in Panel A, where all respondents
are taken into account. The optimal subset of one language contains English. For two languages, the
optimal set contains English and German, and so on.3 The marginal contribution of each additional
language to reducing disenfranchisement falls under one percent of the EU population once the
number of languages exceeds 13 and the di¤erences between marginal contributions attributable to
the further candidate languages are often minute (to save space, we only report the rst eleven
languages). It is interesting to note also that the optimal sets computed according to equation (3)
satisfy the sequencing principle so that every optimal set Tm is a subset of the set Tm+1. In other
words, there exists a sequence of languages l1; : : : ; lL such that
Tm = fl1; : : : ; lmg (4)
This simple observation allows us to present optimal sets in terms of sequences, where the switch
from Tm to Tm+1 is represented by adding a new language lm+1 to the set Tm.
Insert Table 3.
English is clearly the rst language and is spoken well or very well by one third of the EU
population. German and French are in close race for the second position; German, with a 49.3
percent disenfranchisement rate, fares slightly better than French with 50.6 percent. This triple
leads to a disenfranchisement rate of 37.8 percent. Italian, Spanish or Polish would each make
almost the same contribution to reducing disenfranchisement further, with Italian slightly ahead of
the other two languages. Spanish, in turn, performs only marginally better than Polish at the fth
position. With the six largest languages included, 16 percent of the EU population would still remain
2For further details on the calculation and additional results, see Fidrmuc et al. (2007).
3Note that there are instances where two languages result in approximately the same reduction in disenfranchisement
at a particular step in the sequence. For example, the tenth language could be Czech or Greek. Taking Czech as the
tenth language, Greek then appears again as the eleventh language.
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disenfranchised. Adding Romanian brings the residual disenfranchisement rate further down to 13
percent. Note that the addition of Italian, Polish and Romanian reduces disenfranchisement only
because they are spoken as native languages by large domestic populations. Spanish is di¤erent since
it is spoken also in some EU countries other than Spain (and it is also an international language
spoken by large population groups in North, Central and South America).
Panel B presents an analogous sequence which only considers those respondents who are below 30
years of age. The sequence is very similar: the only di¤erence is that French and German switch their
positions. Note also that when considering only young respondents, the resulting disenfranchisement
rates are substantially lower at every step. The marginal contribution from adding further languages
falls below one percent once the sequence includes ten languages.
3 Political Feasibility of Linguistic Reforms
An examination of disenfranchisement rates and optimal sets presented in Table 3 shows that a
unique core language will hardly be su¢ cient as it would yield a disenfranchisement rate of over 60
percent. Even the choice of English, French and German, the languages currently used by the EU
administration, would leave a large fraction of the EU population (38 percent) disenfranchised (26
if we consider the young generation only). The decision on the set of core languages is inevitably a
political one and boils down to deciding what extent of disenfranchisement is tolerable.
Traditionally, most EU decisions were made by unanimity. However, as the EU continued to
expand, agreement by unanimity became increasingly di¢ cult4 and therefore the EU has been grad-
ually moving towards greater application of QMV, in particular with the adoption of the Single
European Act in 1986. The Nice and Lisbon Treaties subsequently conrmed this trend. While this
extended the range of issues for which qualied majority voting (QMV) is used, the EU language
regime remains subject to the unanimity rule. As a result, Maltese and Estonian, at least in theory,
enjoy the same status within the EU as Italian and Polish. This emphasis on national interests is
understandable (and indeed unavoidable) given the institutional framework adopted by the EU and
the tradition of unanimity. It is, however, also inherently undemocratic. In the context of linguistic
policies, it implies that a Maltese or Estonian citizen weighs in more heavily than a Pole or Italian.
Thus, in order to avoid that the EU becomes overwhelmed with dozens of languages and to en-
hance the democratic legitimacy of EU policies, the EU will have to shift the emphasis from national
concerns to those of individual citizens.
Therefore, we now examine under which conditions a linguistic reform could pass under QMV
rules stipulated by the Nice or the Lisbon Treaty.5 It is worth pointing out the voting rules under
4See, e.g., Baldwin et al. (2000, 2001) and Baldwin and Widgren (2004).
5Under the Nice Treaty, each member state has a xed number of votes, with an EU-wide total of 345. For a decision
to pass, the following three requirements apply: (a) the proposal must backed by a majority of states (14 out of 27),
(b) it must be supported by 255 out of the 345 votes, and (c) the states backing the votes must represent at least 62%
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the Lisbon Treaty6 are exactly the same as under the previous draft of the European Constitution.
To discuss the possible variants of QMV, consider a setup withK countries (members or potential
members of the Union). Suppose that the union adopts a variant Q of QMV which imposes a multi-
criteria restriction on the number and conguration of the countries required to support a decision.
Denote the set of all coalitions of countries that satisfy Q criteria by C(Q).
Suppose also that each member k of the Union chooses a maximum acceptable disenfranchisement
rate rk; 0  rk  1 that serves as a threshold determining whether it would support a subset of core
languages in k. Let the rk be given and let R = (r1; : : : ; rK). The set of countries that accept the
set T given their chosen disenfranchisement rates rk and voting criteria Q, is
WQ (T;R) =
n
k : Dk (T )  rk
o
: (5)
Obviously, the setWQ(T;R) is increasing with respect to inclusion and also with respect to vector R.
That is, if T  T 0 then WQ(T;R) WQ(T 0; R) for every R. Likewise, for every set of languages T ,
WQ(T;R) WQ(T;R0) whenever rk  r0k for every country k in the union. The intuition is simple:
an extension of the set of core languages T and an increase of the disenfranchisement thresholds R,
would (weakly) increase the number of countries supporting the choice of (T 0; R0).
Using the set of languages dened by equation (3), and given the vector of acceptable disenfran-
chisement rates R, dene by m(R) the minimal number of languages that guarantees that the set
of countries WQ(Tm(R); R) satises all Q criteria:
m (R) = minfm :WQ (Tm; R) 2 C(Q)g: (6)
The vector R of acceptable disenfranchisement rates is computed as follows. We start with an
acceptable average disenfranchisement rate r (r takes the following values 0.10, 0.20, 0.30, 0.40 and
0.50) and modulate it according to the sensitivity of each country to linguistic issues. To estimate the
countriessensitivities, we use the percentage of citizens of a given country who tend to agree with
the following statement (one of the questions in the Special Eurobarometer 255, 2006 survey): The
European institutions should adopt one single language to communicate with European citizens.
These percentages k are then normalized by the EU-wide weighted response to that question,
denoted as . The countriesrates rk are computed as
rk = r
k

; r = 0:10; :::; 0:50; (7)
and are reproduced in Table 4.
of the EU population (i.e. 303 million). Under the Lisbon Treaty for a decision to pass, it must be supported by 55%
of the countries (15 out of 27) and by 65% of the EU population (318 million).
6The Lisbon Treaty will replace the Nice Treaty in 2014, if no member state raises any objection, or in 2017 if a
member state requests a delay.
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Insert Table 4.
Table 5 presents the results of our calculations for the optimal sets based on all respondents
(Panel A of Table 3), as well as on the young generation aged 15-29 only (Panel B of Table 3):
Insert Table 5.
Consider for instance the case in which all respondents are taken into account. Assume that
the representatives of those countries for which the chosen set of languages results in an acceptable
disenfranchisement rate that is on average smaller than or equal to 10 percent would vote for the
proposal. Then, under the application of the Nice or Lisbon QMV rules, all of the eleven languages
listed in Table 3 would be required for the reform to pass. The number of languages needed to pass
a vote decreases as the acceptable average disenfranchisement rate increases, and it decreases faster
under the Lisbon rules. The provision that is constraining in the case of the Nice Treaty is the xed
number of votes allocated to each country. This criterion is abandoned in the Lisbon Treaty, while
the two remaining criteria are made somewhat stricter than those of the Nice Treaty (15 countries
instead of 14 and 65 percent of the EU population instead of 62 percent). The combined e¤ect leads
nevertheless to a reduction in the number of core languages. Overall, the results show the following
(under Lisbon QMV rules):
1. All respondents. A linguistic reform would be possible if it maintains between ve (Eng-
lish, German, French, Italian, Spanish) and eleven (the previous ones plus Polish, Romanian,
Hungarian, Portuguese, Czech and Greek) core languages as the acceptable average disenfran-
chisement rate goes from 50 to 10 percent.
2. Young generation aged 15-29 only. Between two (English, French) and nine (English, French,
German, Italian, Spanish, Polish, Romanian, Hungarian and Portuguese) core languages would
be required to make the reform politically feasible (again depending on the rate of acceptable
disenfranchisement).
The provisions of both the Nice and the Lisbon Treaty assign relatively more voting power to
large and small countries alike, while preventing middle-sized countries from receiving their fair share
of power. This deciency in assigning voting weights can be rectied by following the Penrose law
which suggests that each country should be assigned a voting right proportional to the square root
of its population. The Penrose weight allocation ensures an equal inuence of every EU citizen on
decisions of the European Council. In the last column of Table 5 we use Penrose weights and assume
that a proposal that reaches 65 percent of the square root of EUs total population would pass.7
7We select the 65 percent threshold so that it is the same as that stipulated by the Lisbon Treaty. Alternatively,
one can use a 62 percent threshold as suggested by Slomczynski, Zastawniak and Zyczkowski (2006) (the so-called
Jagiellonian compromise).
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As can be seen, using Penroses suggestion would allow restricting the number of core languages
quite substantially. A regime with six core languages (English, French, German, Italian, Spanish
and Polish) is likely to be accepted at a reasonably low twenty to thirty percent acceptable average
disenfranchisement rate.
4 Concluding Remarks
Our analysis builds a formal framework to address the impact of extensive multilingualism in
the EU. First, for any given number of languages, we determine the set of languages that minimizes
linguistic disenfranchisement across the Union. This allows us to construct a nested sequence of core
languages, in fact, a menu of possible choices for implementing a potential linguistic reform. It is
very unlikely, however, that all 27 member states would be unanimous (as currently required by EU
law) in their support for a reduction in the number of core languages, unless those populations whose
languages are not part of the core language set are properly compensated.
We therefore compute the minimal number of core languages required under three alternative
voting rules: the qualied-majority-voting provisions of the Nice Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty, and
the Penrose law. It turns out that under the currently valid Nice QMV rules, the EU would need
to maintain a rather large number of languages. It could reduce the set of o¢ cal languages to six,
but only if some countries are ready to accept disenfranchisement rates as high as 50 percent. In
the future, a more restrictive scenario with four to six languages might be feasible, since the Lisbon
Treaty is somewhat less strict than the Nice Treaty, and the current young generation that will be
decisive by then is more uent in foreign languages (especially English). The core EU languages
could then be English, French, German, Italian, Spanish and Polish.
The standardization scenarios that we suggest do not question the principle that all o¢ cial
languages would be used in the Parliament and in contacts between EU institutions and citizens.
Importantly, however, linguistic standardization could stipulate that regulations and legal documents
would be translated into a restricted number of languages (core languages) while the translation into
other languages would be decentralized to countries that would be compensated for doing so, though
only texts in core languages would be legally binding.8
Importantly, a linguistic reform, such as the one suggested in our paper, will change the incentives
for acquiring skills in non-native languages. This will, in turn, change the dynamics of learning of
foreign languages and further changes to the set of core languages should be feasible again later.
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Table 1. Disenfranchisement in European Languages. Native and Foreign Languages
Respondents with Basic or No Linguistic Skills (in %)
English German French Italian Spanish Polish Dutch
Austria 55 1 94 95 98 100 100
Belgium 59 87 29 97 97 99 32
Bulgaria 84 94 96 99 99 100 100
Cyprus 49 98 95 99 99 100 100
Czech Republic 84 81 98 100 100 98 100
Denmark 34 73 97 99 98 100 100
Estonia 75 92 100 100 100 100 100
Finland 69 95 99 100 100 100 100
France 80 95 1 95 93 100 100
Germany 62 1 92 99 98 98 100
Greece 68 94 95 98 100 100 100
Hungary 92 91 100 99 100 100 100
Ireland 1 98 91 100 99 99 100
Italy 75 96 90 3 97 100 100
Latvia 85 97 100 100 100 99 100
Lithuania 86 96 99 100 100 87 100
Luxemburg 61 12 11 95 99 100 99
Malta 32 99 95 65 99 100 100
Netherlands 23 43 81 100 97 100 1
Poland 82 90 99 99 100 2 100
Portugal 85 98 91 99 96 100 100
Romania 86 97 90 98 99 100 100
Slovak Republic 83 82 99 100 100 98 100
Slovenia 59 79 98 91 99 100 100
Spain 84 98 94 99 2 100 100
Sweden 33 88 97 99 99 100 100
United Kingdom 1 98 91 99 98 100 100
EU27 62.6 75.1 80.1 86.7 88.9 91.6 95.1
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Table 2. Disenfranchisement rates
Age Groups (in %)
All 15-29 30-44 45-60 > 60
English 61.2 43.2 57.3 66.6 74.3
German 73.7 72.6 74.0 74.3 74.0
French 79.4 77.1 79.8 79.6 80.5
Italian 86.0 86.3 85.9 85.7 86.3
Spanish 88.3 86.4 88.4 89.2 88.8
Polish 91.1 91.0 91.0 91.2 91.2
Dutch 94.8 94.7 94.8 94.8 94.9
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Table 3. Disenfranchisement rates (DR) in the Sequence of Optimal Sets (in %)
A. All 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10a,b
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10a,b 11
1+ 2+ 3+ 4+ 5+ 6+ 7+ 8+ 9+ 9+
EN GE FR IT SP PL RO HU PT CZ or GR CZ & GR
DR 62.6 49.3 37.8 29.5 22.4 16.4 12.9 10.9 9.2 7.7 6.2
B.  30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1+ 2+ 3+ 4+ 5+ 6+ 7+ 8+ 9+
EN FR GE IT SP PL RO HU PT CZ DR
DR 44.6 34.5 25.8 19.9 14.4 10.4 7.8 6.3 5.1 3.9
Notes: One language is added in each column, as indicated in the second row. In some columns
(e.g. 10a,b in Panel A), two languages result in approximately the same percentage reduction in
disenfranchisement. Languages are abbreviated as follows: Czech (CZ), English (EN), French (FR),
German (GE), Greek (GR), Hungarian (HU), Italian (IT), Spanish (SP), Polish (PL), Portuguese
(PT), Romanian (RO). Panel A considers all respondents, Panel B only those 30 years of age or
younger.
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Table 4. Sensitivity of citizens to language issues
Answers (k) Sensitivity Index Answers (k) Sensitivity Index
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Austria 47 0.87 Latvia 58 1.07
Belgium 59 1.09 Lithuania 56 1.03
Bulgaria 34 0.63 Luxemburg 48 0.88
Cyprus 59 1.09 Malta 50 0.92
Czech Rep. 53 0.98 Netherlands 48 0.88
Denmark 44 0.81 Poland 69 1.27
Estonia 51 0.94 Portugal 50 0.92
Finland 36 0.66 Romania 46 0.85
France 51 0.94 Slovak Rep. 44 0.81
Germany 62 1.14 Slovenia 54 0.99
Greece 58 1.07 Spain 56 1.03
Hungary 65 1.20 Sweden 41 0.76
Ireland 44 0.81 UK 48 0.88
Italy 55 1.01 EU () 54.3 1.00
Column (1) reports percentages of citizens who that tend to agree" with the following state-
ment: The European institutions should adopt one single language to communicate with European
citizens." Column (2) is obtained by dividing these numbers by the weighted average for the overall
EU (54.3%).
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Table 5. Voting scenarios. Minimal number of languages satisfying QMV
Acceptable average Nice Treaty Lisbon Treaty Penrose Law
disenfranchisement rate
All
10 11 11 9
20 10 10 8
30 9 10 7
40 9 8 7
50 7 5 6
 30
10 9 9 7
20 7 5 6
30 7 5 6
40 5 3 4
50 4 2 3
Nice: Approved if 255 votes, and 14 countries representing 62% of the population (303 million) vote
for the reform
Lisbon: Approved, if 15 countries representing 65% of the population (318 million) vote for the
reform
Penrose: Approved if 65% of the sum of the square roots of individual countriespopulations vote
for the reform
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